BS EN 81-76:2025 Evacuation Lift Guidance
This reiterates the guidance in the National foreword of BS EN 81-76:2025 and then provides further more detailed guidance on various building-related considerations for incorporating evacuation lifts in buildings.
The National foreword of BS EN 81-76 was drafted by the BSI lifts hoists and escalators committee, MHE/4, since the committee recognised that further guidance on some important topics might be helpful with the introduction of a new standard for evacuation lifts. The National foreword also included a link to this page so that further guidance could be developed to assist with the use and application of the standard.
The references to clauses and Annexes in the following text are to parts of BS EN 81-76:2025. Links are included where further guidance is provided here.
Our intention is to further develop this guidance in collaboration with interested parties.
Text based on the National foreword of BS EN 81-76:2025
This British Standard is the UK implementation of EN 81‑76:2025. It supersedes DD CEN/TS 81-76:2011 which is withdrawn.
The National foreword to DD CEN/TS 81-76:2011 made clear that in the United Kingdom the description of an evacuation lift was to be found in BS 9999. The UK committee believes BS EN 81-76 is a significant improvement in the state of the art for evacuation lifts compared with either DD CEN/TS 81-76:2011 (which was not adopted in the UK) or BS 9999.
Significant lead times are to be expected for new evacuation lifts owing to the design, development and conformity assessment of solutions to meet this standard; provision of building elements to protect an evacuation lift; and provision of necessary signals to the lift controls.
Consequently users of this standard are advised to liaise with relevant parties and to allow adequate time after publication of this document for suitable solutions to become available. There is more on transition below.
This Standard forms part of a series of standards concerning the safe design of passenger and goods passenger lifts. It is intended to be read in conjunction with the other standards in the series; in particular, the base standard BS EN 81-20 for the design of new lifts.
The implementation of a safe evacuation lift depends on the satisfactory integration of the evacuation lift into the building. This needs collaboration between those responsible for the lift and those responsible for other aspects (outside the lift) such as:
> building-related conditions in which the lift is installed (see Annex C);
> the number and size of evacuation lifts based on capacity assessment (see B.1.2, C.2);
> specification of optional evacuation modes for driver assisted evacuation and/or automatic evacuation operation (see Introduction, Annex B);
> specification of the evacuation lift as either of Class A or Class B (see Introduction, B.1.1);
> minimum lift car size depending on whether the intended use is to include a stretcher or trolley stretcher, and whether the evacuation lift is Class A or Class B (see 4.3.2);
> a means to suspend evacuation operation if fire or smoke is detected (see 4.3.6, 4.4.2, 4.5.4, C.3);
> whether the evacuation lift is also a firefighters lift (see 4.4.1);
> signals to recall the lift and for selection of evacuation operational mode(s) (see 4.4.2);
> for automatic evacuation operation, any signals for active floor alarms and a signal for the evacuation of all floors (see 4.4.2, 4.5.3.2.2);
> for a Class A evacuation lift with no secondary power supply, the landing to which the evacuation lift recovers (see 7.2.1);
> clarification that any emergency voice communication system in a temporary waiting space outside the lift is separate from the communication system required on a lift with remote assisted evacuation operation or driver assisted evacuation operation (see 4.7).
For further information please see: https://www.leia.co.uk/bs-en-81-76-evacuation-lift-guidance/.
This publication has been prepared under a mandate given to the European Standards Organizations by the European Commission and the European Free Trade Association. It is intended to support requirements of the EU legislation detailed in the European Foreword. A European Annex, Annex:ZA, describes how this publication relates to that EU legislation.
For the Great Britain market (England, Scotland and Wales), if UK Government has designated this publication for conformity with UKCA marking (or similar) legislation, it may contain an additional National Annex. Where such a National Annex exists, it shows the correlation between this publication and the relevant UK legislation. If there is no National Annex of this kind, the relevant Annex ZA or ZZ in the body of the European text will indicate the relationship to UK regulation applicable in Great Britain. References to EU legislation may need to be read in accordance with the UK designation and the applicable UK law. Further information on designated standards can be found at www.bsigroup.com/standardsandregulation.
For the Northern Ireland market, UK law will continue to implement relevant EU law subject to periodic confirmation. Therefore Annex:ZA in the European text, and references to EU legislation, are still valid for this market.
UK Government is responsible for legislation. For information on legislation and policies relating to that legislation, consult the relevant pages of www.gov.uk.
END OF TEXT BASED ON NATIONAL FOREWORD
Transition
The European foreword of BS EN 81-76:2025 includes the following:
“This European Standard shall be given the status of a national standard, either by publication of an identical text or by endorsement, at the latest by January 2026, and conflicting national standards shall be withdrawn at the latest by July 2027.”
We currently have the evacuation lift described in BS 9999:2017, Annex G – which should be revised or withdrawn within two years. Until then through this transition period it is acceptable to work to either BS 9999:2017, Annex G or BS EN 81-76 as products become available. Work is starting on a revision of BS 9999 which would be expected to replace the evacuation lift described in Annex G with references to BS EN 81-76.
Once EN 81-76 becomes a designated standard, following it will provide a presumption of conformity to the relevant Essential Health and Safety Requirements (EHSRs) of the Lifts Regulations. A lift provider following BS EN 81-76 will be expected to include this on their Declaration of Conformity (DoC) for the lift and, in the case that the lift does not fully conform to BS EN 81-76, apply to their Approved Body for approval and issuing of a Design Examination Certificate (DEC) to cover the deviations from specific clauses in BS EN 81-76. A lift contractor‘s Approved Body is very unlikely to approve a deviation from BS EN 81-76 without relevant approvals from the relevant fire service and building control authority. Where evacuation lift provisions are based solely on BS 9999 Annex G, this will not appear on the DoC, as this is not a designated standard under the UK Lifts Regulations.
For safe integration of an evacuation lift, there are many aspects of the building design that also have to be addressed. The key issues appear to be the design of the ventilation systems to keep lift lobbies free of smoke and fire and the complex interfacing signals that are required between the lift control system and the fire control panels or Building Management Systems (BMS) that enable the various modes and phases of evacuation operation. The issue of transition and the other factors prompted the following text to be written in to the National foreword of BS EN 81-76:2025:
“Significant lead times are to be expected for new evacuation lifts owing to the design, development and conformity assessment of solutions to meet this standard; provision of building elements to protect an evacuation lift; and provision of necessary signals to the lift controls.
Consequently, users of this standard are advised to liaise with relevant parties and to allow adequate time after publication of this document for suitable solutions to become available.”
With the introduction of BS EN 81-76, we expect that there will be a learning curve for building designers, fire engineers, providers of fire detection and alarm systems etc with lift providers as they assimilate the needs to the various building-related and interface issues have been taken care of (see also the National foreword which lists the key points).
FprEN 81-76 was referenced in BS 9991:2024 and there is Construction Leadership Council (CLC) and Building Safety Regulator (BSR) guidance to the effect that they do not expect schemes sufficiently progressed in design, currently under construction or sufficiently progressed on site having to undertake a fundamental redesign on the basis of the updated publication and inclusion of additional measures.
Consequently, LEIA does not expect lift manufacturers or those providing the building-related systems and interfaces needed for an evacuation lift to have fully detailed designs ready before the end of 2025 and for lift manufacturers to be able to deliver compliant lift solutions before mid-2026.
Future-proofing
In the meatime, until fully compliant evacuation lift solutions are available, we would suggest that the evacuation lift described in BS 9999:2017, Annex G could be specified. However, it is important to note that Annex G only supports managed evacuation, which may not be suitable for buildings without 24 hour staffing which can take control of evacuation lifts.
In the absence of a standard describing automatic evacuation operation, some buildings have adopted risk-based strategies to enable a form of automatic evacuation. In buildings with a stay-put strategy, this has involved delaying the signal to suspend the lift from service; allowing the lift to remain in normal operation even after fire detection. Additional fire detection monitoring has been installed at the lift entrances and lift spaces, configured to send a signal to suspend lift operation only when fire is detected in those specific zones.
This approach of allowing the lift to remain in normal operation by postponing the suspend service signal to the lift control system has drawbacks listed in the bullet points below. As lift solutions for automatic evacuation become available it might be acceptable, based on risk assessment to specify the use of automatic evacuation operation as described in BS EN 81-76 with building interface for detection of smoke or heat at the safe areas and lift spaces, even when the full building conditions of BS EN 81-76 cannot be fully met due to circumstances during this transitional period. This could be seen as an improved offering over leaving lifts in normal operation as described above for several reasons, including:
> A lift contractor may be reluctant to offer a solution based on leaving a lift in normal operation, which is not to a recognised evacuation lift standard. They could instead provide a solution that more effectively addresses the following key points. However, any changes to the original fire and evacuation strategy must be reviewed, updated, and formally approved by its designated owner.
> Leaving a lift in normal operation would allow people entering the building to call the lift and use it to move away from an exit floor, perhaps towards the fire floor or even to the fire floor. Whereas the call prioritization and functional features defined in BS EN 81-76 are solely to support the safe evacuation of occupants to exit from the building.
> Leaving a lift in normal operation would allow it to be called from floors other than those requiring evacuation and for passengers to travel towards or even to the fire floor. Whereas the call prioritization and functional features defined in BS EN 81-76 will only support the safe evacuation of occupants to exit from the building, passengers cannot select car calls when in the lift, it will only take them to the exit floor with clear instruction to leave the car on arrival.
> Leaving a lift in normal operation would not prioritize the collection of landing calls, whereas call prioritization is a part of the logic in BS EN 81-76 automatic operation.
> The use of the lift without supervision by building management has implications for the fire protection of the lift well, lobbies, machinery spaces, refuges etc., which should be covered by a fire detection and alarm system to immediately remove the lift from evacuation service (using the methodology in BS EN 81-73) if smoke or fire is detected in these areas. A BS EN 81-76 solution for automatic operation would incorperate the signal to suspend service that could be interfaced to the building alarm system, along with the other signals required; further details of these signal are included in this guidance.
The basis of protection of an evacuation lift, lobbies, machinery spaces and access/egress routes, resilient power supplies, and water management to prevent water ingress into the lift well are essential to the safe operation of an evacuation lift but are elements of building design. These are defined in Building Regulations guidance and in standards such as BS 9991 and BS 9999 to address building-related conditions in which the lift is installed as listed in BS EN 81-76:2025, Annex C.
Within C.3, there is a requirement: “It shall be instructed that the evacuation lift’s operating environment is protected from the effects of fire and ingress of smoke for at least the defined duration of the evacuation.”
For the application of BS EN 81-76, a key issue is around evacuation lift lobbies and lift spaces. As a lift standard, BS EN 81-76 is based on people waiting in lobbies and using an evacuation lift being protected from smoke and fire by the building design. How this is achieved is for building design standards.
Within BS EN 81-76, “lobby” is not used in favour of the term “safe area” which is defined as “fire and smoke protected area at the landing in front of an evacuation lift”. BS EN 81-76, C.3 has a requirement for instructions for lobbies/safe areas to be kept free of fire and smoke. There is a requirement for a suspend service signal which BS EN 81-76:2025 notes “allows a building management system (fire detection and fire alarm system or BMS) to suspend evacuation operation, e.g. if smoke or fire is detected in the lift spaces or safe areas.”
Capacity Assessment
The following text is a basic discussion. LEIA invites interested parties to work with LEIA to draft more detailed and useful guidance.
Both the London Plan D5(B5) and BS 9991:2024 refer to at least one evacuation lift to be provided for each escape stairway, or more if required by capacity assessment. It is recognized that in simple and low-rise buildings it might be possible to define building, population and lift parameters for which capacity assessment would not be required. The use of capacity assessment as part of evacuation lift planning is a new area and guidance is expected to be developed for when capacity assessment would be appropriate and, when applicable, on guidance on its use to define a minimum number and size of evacuation lifts.
Some key parameters may be identified:
> the size and the capacity of evacuation lift(s) – with larger car sizes than 1100 mm x 1400 mm being required on Type B evacuation lifts and where evacuation of people on trolley stretchers is required;
> the expected duration of the evacuation;
> floors to be evacuated with the evacuation lift(s);
> relevant numbers of people who would use evacuation lift(s) (noting that the proportion of building occupants who might need to use evacuation lift(s) would be expected to increase with floor height);
> evacuation exit landing(s) (EEL), the suspend service landing (SSL) and
> alternative means of evacuation for people who require level egress, in case the evacuation lift is not available (e.g. in the case of an evacuation lift without an independent secondary power supply).
Readers are referred to papers such as Mellor, N J (2022) Challenges to Drafting a Standard for the Evacuation of Disabled People Using Lifts in: Proceedings of the 13th Symposium on Lift and Escalator Technologies, Northampton (available at: https://www.liftsymposium.org/2022-symposium), and Farr, K (2024) Theoretical Evaluation of Evacuation Lift Capacity Assessments in: Proceedings of the 15th Symposium on Lift and Escalator Technologies, Northampton (available at: https://www.liftsymposium.org/2024-symposium). As noted above LEIA would work with interested parties to frame more detailed guidance in this area.
Optional evacuation modes
BS EN 81-76:2025 recognises that an evacuation lift might be operated in different ways and anticipated this by including three optional evacuation operations. The selection of at least one evacuation operation is mandatory for the application of the standard – more than one option may be selected.
The three operations are:
> Automatic evacuation operation
This option is new and was developed to allow an evacuation lift to operate under the control of the building systems to allow those people requiring level access/egress to us the lift to evacuate from the building. It is therefore a significant step forward and is referenced from BS 9991:2024.
> Driver assisted evacuation operation
This option has similarities with the current evacuation lift operation in BS 9999:2017, Annex G although is much developed. Driver assisted evacuation operation is also referenced from BS 9991:2024.
> Remote assisted evacuation operation
This option is new and allows the lift to be controlled from a location outside (i.e. remote) from the lift car.
Several critical issues related to this mode of operation require careful consideration including the:
– security of the communication between remote control location and the evacuation lift;
– monitoring of the building condition from the remote control location;
– training and authorisation of person(s) controlling the lift remotely.
The requirements for remote-assisted evacuation operation are complex and typically demand extensive infrastructure including containment for wiring, cabling, network equipment, and coordinated development between multiple parties. As a result, implementation is likely to be costly. For these reasons, we strongly discourage its use. BS 9991:2024 does not reference this option.
Those responsible for specifying the evacuation lift should have sufficient understanding of the operation mode they are selecting, the needs of the building to protect the lift and the requirements for signals and interfaces to the evacuation lift.
Key signal requirements for the evacuation lift
The different phases and modes of operation for an evacuation lift to BS EN 81-76 depends on signals from systems in the building such as a fire control panels and BMS systems.
Signals required by an evacuation lift would include those:
> to remove the lift from normal operation and recall it to the evacuation exit landing (EEL);
> to place the lift into the required evacuation operation mode – this is particularly important where automatic evacuation operation is used;
> where landing calls are to be accepted only from priority floor(s), to signal the active floor alarms;
> where provided, to signal the evacuation of all floors;
> to remove the lift from operation while the suspend service signal is active (so if the signal is de-activated, the lift should return to operation and obey the other signals above).
Note: the suspend service signal (see Building-related conditions) allows a building management system (fire detection and fire alarm system or BMS) to suspend operation e.g. if smoke or fire is detected in the lift spaces or lobbies.
To enable this functionality, the evacuation lift must be configured with specific parameters and input signals, which will depend on the building’s design and the evacuation stratigy for modes of operation.
Parameters
The building evacuation strategy must provide details for programming into the lift control system parameters including:
> the floors defined to be served for evacuation (e.g. floors G -15)
> the Designated floors to be programmed for the Evacuation Exit Landing (EEL) and Suspend Service Landing (SSL).
Input signals to the evacuation lift controls
The fire control or BMS panel needs to provide signals to activate evacuation modes for example:
> EEL 1 (Evacuation Exit Landing 1) – recall the lift to the landing defined in EEL 1
> EEL 2 (Evacuation Exit Landing 2) – recall the lift to the landing defined in EEL 2
> Signal to start ‘Automatic Evacuation Operation’
> Signal to start ‘Driver Assisted Evacuation Operation‘
> A single signal to service ‘all defined floors’ for evacuation
> SSL (Suspend Service Landing) – a signal to suspend evacuation operations and return to the SSL
> Active floor alarm (1 signal for every floor defined to be served for evacuation, to alert of a fire on that floor).
Power supplies
BS 9999:2017 recommends that the primary electrical supply for an evacuation lift should be obtained from a sub-main circuit exclusive to the lift and independent of any other main or sub-main circuit. It allows for other lifts in the same well to be fed from the same primary supply, provided that the supply is adequate for the purpose.
A secondary power supply meeting BS 8519, such as a generator, is often provided for evacuation lifts to satisfy G.2.2 of BS 9999:2017 or BS 9991:2024, 7.4.2 which also allow under certain circumstances for the provision of a separately fused protected circuit fed directly from the main incoming electrical supply to the building located in a fire protected enclosure.
The conclusion from these is that an evacuation lift requires an independent secondary power supply except where it is a Class A evacuation lift which is provided with Automatic Rescue Operation that operates automatically in case of failure or loss of power supply to move the lift car to a landing. In the event that a Class A evacuation lift is specified, the evacuation strategy would then need to address measures if the power supply fails removing the evacuation lift from use.
BS 9991:2024 states that for residential buildings:
An evacuation lift, the associated voice communication system and lighting to both the lift car and temporary waiting space should have both primary and secondary power supplies as follows.
> For Class A lifts in buildings, or parts of buildings, with no storey at 18 m or more above ground level, the secondary power supply should be either:
– an independent secondary power supply; or
– a separately fused circuit fed directly from the main incoming electrical supply to the building, located in a fire-protected enclosure. In addition, BS9991:2024 specifies the lift to have automatic rescue operation that, in the event of a power failure, moves the lift car automatically to the final exit level and opens the doors to allow passengers to escape)
> For class B Lifts or buildings with a storey at 18 m or more above ground level, there should be an independent secondary power supply.
The guidance in BS 9991 goes further than BS EN 81-76 calling for the automatic rescue system to return the lift to the final exit level, where BS EN 81-76 requires the return to a safe area and does not specify the level. BS 9991 is not intended to increase the fire load in the lift well by locating large batteries such as lithium types within the well, rather any additional UPS or energy sources required to achieve return to the exit level should be located in containment areas. It should be agreed which level any automatic rescue system should return to as part of the evacuation strategy for the building.
Communication system
BS EN 81-76 has requirements for an evacuation lift communication system for driver assisted evacuation and remote assisted evacuation operation (not for automatic evacuation operation). This communication system is not to be confused with a communication system in BS 9999 or BS 9991:2024 to connect to temporary waiting spaces outside the evacuation lift. This is reinforced by BS 9991:2024 which makes it clear that such a communication system is separate from the evacuation lift communication system.
It is important to clarify that evacuation lifts operating in either automatic or driver-assisted modes do not require a landing communication system. This is because lift calls are initiated via landing buttons, not through voice communication.
The communication system referenced in BS 9991 for refuge areas is independent of the lift system. It functions as a standalone solution designed to support the overall evacuation strategy; particularly in scenarios where the lift service may be unavailable, such as when an active SSL signal has suspended lift operation.
END OF GUIDANCE